Kate Reinmuth
PhD Candidate at Stanford Department of Economics
Welcome! I'm a 5th-year PhD candidate in Economics at Stanford University, specializing in industrial organization and labor/public economics. I am advised by Neale Mahoney, Nick Bloom, Liran Einav, Heidi Williams, and Ali Yurukoglu.
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Contact: reinmuth@stanford.edu​​​​
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I also completed my JD at Stanford Law School in June 2025, which has helped inform my work on how legal and policy regimes — especially in antitrust, contract, and IP law — affect workers, consumers, firms, and markets.
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My work is supported by Knight-Hennessy Scholars and Stanford Impact Labs.​
Before coming to Stanford, I graduated from Middlebury College in 2017 and spent time working outside of academia with organizations like the White House Council of Economic Advisers (Obama Administration), the Brookings Institution (CEPM), and NERA Economic Consulting (Antitrust).​

Photo by Vanessa Coleman
Working Papers​
Consumer Welfare and Misallocation in Panic Buying of Gasoline
with Katja Hofmann
Panic buying describes a sudden, unanticipated surge in demand, triggered by a real or perceived disruption. In anticipation, consumers front-load purchases, thereby congesting the market and raising the risk of shortages. When prices are slow to adjust, non-price rationing emerges, with ambiguous effects on allocative efficiency across heterogeneous consumers. We study the welfare and allocative effects of panic buying in the context of a two-week episode of panic buying of gasoline in the UK. We combine novel data on station wait times and card transactions to study two sources of welfare loss: elevated shopping costs and misallocation. We develop a model in which heterogeneous consumers trade off the benefit from refueling, given their belief about future fuel availability, against endogenously determined shopping costs. Compared to the optimal allocation, we find substantial losses in status-quo consumer surplus driven by misallocation as front-loading consumers crowded out those with emptier gas tanks. We evaluate alternative allocation rules and their potential in mitigating these losses.
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Disclosures, Deals, and Dollars: A Survey of Management Practices in University Technology Transfer Offices (Draft Coming Soon)
with Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Daniela Scur, and Heidi Williams
We collect new data on management practices for a broad sample of university-based technology transfer offices (TTOs) in the United States. We survey these offices on a variety of topics, including their objectives and vision for the office; their processes around invention disclosure, patent filing, and licensing; performance metrics; budget setting; and employee appraisal. We find that TTOs report heterogeneous office objectives, processes, and structures. These differences matter for commercialization outcomes. For example, although there has been a push for process standardization, not all TTO tasks are equally well suited to systematization.
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Publications and Accepted Papers
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Innovation through Inventor Mobility: Evidence from Non-Compete Agreements (Conditionally Accepted at AEJ Applied; Current Draft: November 2025)
with Emma Rockall
Proponents of labor mobility restrictions argue that innovation incentives more than offset harm to workers. Yet the causal effect of such policies on innovation is an open empirical question. Leveraging plausibly exogenous state-level changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements, we find a significant negative effect on innovation. This effect is even larger for the most novel and innovative patents and firms. Further analysis shows that these negative effects on innovation cannot be explained by entry alone and instead likely result from reduced knowledge flows. Our findings suggest that labor mobility plays a crucial role in spreading knowledge across firms.
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Policy Impact: cited in FTC Final Rule Banning NCAs, Senate Testimony, and Ohio Senate Testimony
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Turnover, Loyalty and Competence in the West Wing: The Trump White House in Historical Context (Pres. Studies Quarterly, 2021)
with Matthew Dickinson
Pundits and scholars alike point to the high rates of administrative chaos and staff turnover in the Trump White House, but prior research has not been able to pin down the cause(s) empirically. In this paper, we develop a survival model and conduct a Bayesian latent trait analysis to examine the tenure rates of White House aides serving presidents Nixon through Trump. We find that, compared to his presidential predecessors, Trump′s White House stands out for its lack of personally loyal aides. This is not surprising given that his pre-presidential career would not have allowed him to develop the cadre of political loyalists that typically accompanied his predecessors into the West Wing. Nonetheless, we show that it was this lack of personal loyalty among his staff, and not any shortcoming in competence, that led to high rates of turnover.
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Law Review Writing
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Striking the Balance: University Commercialization and Scientific Research Productivity (Stanford J. of Law, Econ., and Bus., 2025)
University-based discoveries that drive economic growth are a natural byproduct of scientific research. However, many of these inventions never realize their full potential value because they “languish” in universities and never diffuse to the broader economy. University technology license agreements are critical tools for idea diffusion. However, some fear that giving scientists more commercial responsibilities will crowd out core scientific tasks like basic research. To assess these competing viewpoints, this Note investigates the impact of university technology licensing on scientists’ academic research performance at Stanford University, finding that licensing significantly increases the number of papers that a scientist publishes and providing a promising indication of the complementarity of academic research and technology transfer.
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News Coverage: Stanford Report
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Default Difficulties: Merchants' Reliance on Default Rules that Harm Consumers (Stanford Law Review, 2025)
This Note investigates how incomplete contracting between merchant parties may harm third-party consumers. After defining this phenomenon and noting several examples, this Note considers solutions to the social inefficiencies arising from these merchant-to-merchant contracts. To do so, this Note engages in a detailed case study of generic drug shortages and how incomplete failure-to-supply provisions affect patients’ ability to access essential drugs. Such shortages typify the incomplete contracts at issue in this Note. Ultimately, this Note proposes a regulatory solution to firms’ reliance on default rules that would reduce the incidence of extreme negative externalities on third parties.
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Other Writing
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Change and Continuity in White House Staffing: The Trump Factor (De Gruyter, 2021)
with Matthew Dickinson
Early assessments of Trump’s White House portrayed an organization riven by personality disputes and administrative chaos. But in many ways, Trump’s White House staff descriptively bears a strong resemblance to its predecessors, as we demonstrate by drawing on more than 50 years of data on presidential staff composition. In terms of size, structure, and the distributions of functions, the Trump White House represents not a break with the past so much as its continuation. Trump’s staffing patterns departed from precedent more in the areas of staff turnover and recruitment; however, it is not clear just how significant those changes are.
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Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is National (De Gruyter, 2017)
with Matthew Dickinson
John McCain’s dramatic early-morning “no” vote may have been the immediate cause of the Republican failure to repeal and replace Obamacare. However, Republicans undertook this endeavor from a weak political vantage point. The 2016 elections gave Republicans very little margin for error in Congress – a margin threatened by Trump’s inexperience and lack of political capital. Longer-term trends, including the polarization of the two congressional parties against the backdrop of increasingly nationalized elections, exacerbated this situation by leaving Trump and Republicans little choice but to legislate through their own party caucus – or to not legislate at all.​​